Ceci est un poste d'hôtes par Richard Heinberg. Richard est Senior Fellow de l'Institut de carbone Post et auteur de cinq livres sur l'épuisement des ressources et des réponses de la société au problème de l'énergie. Il peut être trouvé sur le web à www.richardheinberg.com et www.postcarbon.org.
Tout le monde est d'accord: notre économie est malade. Les symptômes comprennent des déclins incontournable dans les dépenses des consommateurs et la confiance des consommateurs, avec une contraction du commerce international et du crédit disponible. Add a collapse in real estate values and carnage in the automotive and airline industries and the picture looks grim indeed.
But why are both the US economy and the larger global economy ailing? Among the mainstream media, world leaders, and America's economists-in-chief (Treasury Secretary Geithner and Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke) there is near-unanimity of opinion: these recent troubles are primarily due to a combination of bad real estate loans and poor regulation of financial derivatives.
C'est le diagnostic conventionnel. Si elle est correcte, alors le traitement pour notre maladie économiques pourraient logiquement comprennent de fortes doses de l'argent pour le renflouement des institutions financières en difficulté, les prêteurs hypothécaires et les compagnies de voiture, une meilleure régulation des produits dérivés et les marchés à terme et les programmes de relance des dépenses de consommation JumpStart.
But what if this diagnosis is fundamentally flawed? The metaphor needs no belaboring: we all know that tragedy can result from a doctor's misreading of symptoms, mistaking one disease for another.
Something similar holds for our national and global economic infirmity. If we don't understand why the world's industrial and financial metabolism is seizing up, we are unlikely to apply the right medicine and could end up making matters much worse than they would otherwise be.
Pour être sûr: le diagnostic conventionnel est clairement moins en partie droite. The causal connections between subprime mortgage loans and the crises at Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Lehman Brothers have been thoroughly explored and are well known. Clearly, over the past few years, speculative bubbles in real estate and the financial industry were blown up to colossal dimensions, and their bursting was inevitable. It is hard to disagree with the words of Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, in his July 25 essay in the Sydney Morning Herald: “The roots of the crisis lie in the preceding decade of excess. Dans le monde il bénéficié d'un boom extraordinaire .... Cependant, comme nous appris plus tard, le boom mondial a été construit en grande partie sur une maison ... de cartes. Tout d'abord, dans de nombreux pays occidentaux le boom a été créé sur un tas de dettes détenues par les consommateurs, les entreprises et certains gouvernements. As the global financier George Soros put it: 'For 25 years [the West] has been consuming more than we have been producing … living beyond our means.'” (1)
Mais est-ce pour autant que nous devons regarder pour se rendre à la racine de la crise économique mondiale continue?
Un cas peut être faite que les événements terribles d'avoir à faire avec l'immobilier, les marchés dérivés, et les industries de l'automobile et du transport aérien étaient eux-mêmes que les symptômes d'une encore plus profonde, un dysfonctionnement systémique qui signifie la fin de la croissance économique comme nous l'avons connu.
En bref, je suggère un autre diagnostic. This explanation for the economic crisis is not for the faint of heart because, if correct, it implies that the patient is far sicker than even the most pessimistic economists are telling us. But if it is correct, then by ignoring it we risk even greater peril.
Economic Growth, The Financial Crisis, and Peak Oil
Depuis plusieurs années, une sous-culture enflure des commentateurs (qui comprend le présent auteur) a été la prévision un krach financier, en se basant sur l'évaluation pronostique que la production mondiale de pétrole était sur le point de crête. (2) Notre raisonnement était le suivant:
Augmentations continues de la population et la consommation ne peut pas continuer éternellement sur une planète finie. Cette observation est axiomatique avec lequel chacun familier avec les mathématiques de la croissance arithmétique aggravé doit accepter, même si elles spéculatifs leur accord avec de vagues références à la «substituabilité» et «transitions démographiques». (3)
This axiomatic limit to growth means that the rapid expansion in both population and per-capita consumption of resources that has occurred over the past century or two must cease at some particular time. Mais quand est-ce probable?
La limite injustement décrié à des études de croissance, d'abord publié en 1972 avec les mises à jour périodiques, depuis, ont tenté de répondre à la question de l'analyse de la disponibilité des ressources et de l'épuisement, et plusieurs scénarios pour la future croissance démographique et les taux de consommation. Le scénario le plus pessimiste en 1972 suggère une fin de la croissance économique mondiale vers 2015. (4)
Mais il peut y avoir un moyen plus simple de la disparition de prévisions de croissance du.
L'énergie est le catalyseur ultime de la croissance (encore une fois, cela est évident: la physique et la biologie à la fois nous dire que sans l'énergie passe rien). L'expansion industrielle au cours des deux derniers siècles a été dans tous les cas basée sur la consommation d'énergie accrue. (5) More specifically, industrialism has been inextricably tied to the availability and consumption of cheap energy from coal and oil (and more recently, natural gas). Toutefois, les combustibles fossiles sont de par leur nature même, appauvrissant, les ressources non renouvelables. Conséquent (selon la thèse du pic pétrolier), l'incapacité éventuelle de continuer à augmenter l'approvisionnement en énergie fossile bon marché mènera probablement à un arrêt de la croissance économique en général, à moins sources d'énergie alternatives et l'efficacité de la consommation d'énergie peut être déployée rapidement et à un degré suffisant. (6)
Parmi les trois combustibles fossiles classiques, le pétrole est sans doute le plus économiquement vitale, car elle fournit 95 pour cent de toutes les énergies du transport. Further, petroleum is the fuel with which we are likely to encounter supply problems soonest, because global petroleum discoveries have been declining for decades, and most oil producing countries are already seeing production declines. (7)
So, by this logic, the end of economic growth (as conventionally defined) is inevitable, and Peak Oil is the likely trigger.
Pourquoi Peak Oil conduisent pas seulement à des problèmes pour l'industrie du transport, mais une crise plus générale économique et financière? Pendant la croissance siècle passé s'est institutionnalisée dans le nerf même de notre système économique. Every city and business wants to grow. Cela est compréhensible seulement en termes de nature humaine: presque tout le monde veut un avantage concurrentiel sur quelqu'un d'autre, et la croissance fournit l'occasion d'y parvenir. But there is also a financial survival motive at work: without growth, businesses and governments are unable to service their debt. Et la dette est devenu endémique au système industriel. Pendant les deux dernières décennies, l'industrie des services financiers a augmenté plus rapidement que tout autre secteur de l'économie américaine, dépassant même la hausse des dépenses en soins de santé, ce qui représente un tiers de toute la croissance de l'économie américaine. De 1990 à aujourd'hui, le ratio de la dette au PIB est passée de 165 pour cent à plus de 350 pour cent. En substance, le bien-être actuel de l'économie repose sur la dette, et la garantie de cette dette se compose d'un pari que l'année prochaine niveaux de la production et la consommation sera plus élevé que cette année.
Étant donné que la croissance ne peut pas continuer sur une planète finie, ce pari, et son incarnation dans les institutions de financement, on peut dire que constituent le plus grand de l'histoire combine à la Ponzi. Nous avons justifié l'emprunt actuellement avec la croyance irrationnelle que la croissance perpétuelle est possible, nécessaire et inévitable. En effet, nous avons emprunté aux générations futures afin que nous puissions dilapider leur capital aujourd'hui.
Jusqu'à récemment, l'argument le pic pétrolier a été présentée comme une prévision: le déclin inévitable de la production pétrolière mondiale, quand elle survient, va tuer la croissance. Mais c'est là où les prévisions devient diagnostic: durant la période 2005 à 2008, de l'énergie a cessé de croître et les prix du pétrole atteint des niveaux records. En Juillet 2008, le prix d'un baril de pétrole a frôlé la barre près de 150 fois et demie supérieur à tout prix pétroliers précédents corrigés de l'inflation des termes et l'économie mondiale commençait à tomber. Les industries automobile et aérienne frémit; consommateurs ordinaires avait de la difficulté pour l'achat d'essence pour leur rendre au travail tout en continuant à payer leur hypothèque. Les dépenses de consommation a commencé à décliner. En Septembre de la crise économique a aussi été une crise financière, les banques tremblé et a implosé. (8)
Given how much is at stake, it is important to evaluate the two diagnoses on the basis of facts, not preconceptions.
Il est inutile d'examiner les éléments probants justifiant ou de réfuter le diagnostic conventionnel, parce que sa validité n'est pas mise en doute, comme une explication partielle de ce qui se passe. The question is whether it is a sufficient explanation, and hence an adequate basis for designing a successful response.
What's the evidence favoring the Alternative? Un bon endroit pour commencer est avec un document récent de l'économiste James Hamilton de l'Université de Californie, San Diego, intitulé «Causes et conséquences du choc pétrolier de 2007-08», qui discute les prix du pétrole et des impacts économiques avec la clarté, la logique, et des chiffres, en expliquant comment et pourquoi le krach économique est lié à la flambée des prix du pétrole de 2008. (9)
Hamilton débute en citant des études antérieures montrant une corrélation étroite entre les pics des prix du pétrole et les récessions. Sur la base de cette corrélation, tous les économistes attentifs devraient avoir prévu une profonde récession en 2008. «En effet», écrit Hamilton, «la relation pourrait expliquer le ralentissement de 2007-08 entière .... If one could have known in advance what happened to oil prices during 2007-08, and if one had used the historically estimated relation [between price rise and economic impact]… one would have been able to predict the level of real GDP for both of 2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4 quite accurately.”
Again, this is not to ignore the role of the financial and real estate sectors in the ongoing global economic meltdown. Mais dans le diagnostic alternatif de l'effondrement des marchés du logement et de produits dérivés est perçu comme un signal amplifiant finalement émanant d'un échec à accroître le taux d'approvisionnement de l'épuisement des ressources. Hamilton encore: «Au minimum, il est clair que quelque chose autre que le logement s'est détériorée à transformer la croissance lente dans une récession. Ce quelque chose, dans mon esprit, inclut l'effondrement des achats d'automobiles, ralentissement des dépenses de consommation globale, et la confiance des consommateurs se détériore, dans laquelle le choc pétrolier a été incontestablement un facteur aggravant. "
Par ailleurs, Hamilton note qu'il y avait «un effet d'interaction entre le choc pétrolier et les problèmes de logement." C'est, dans de nombreuses régions métropolitaines, les prix des maisons en 2007 étaient encore en hausse dans les codes postaux plus proches des centres urbains, mais déjà en baisse rapide dans codes postaux où les trajets sont longs. (10)
Pourquoi avez la flambée des prix du pétrole?
Those who espouse the Conventional Diagnosis for our ongoing economic collapse might agree that there was some element of causal correlation between the oil price spike and the recession, but they would deny that the price spike itself had anything to do with resource limits, because (they say) it was caused mostly by speculation in the oil futures market, and had little to do with fundamentals of supply and demand.
En cela, le diagnostic conventionnel une fois de plus a un certain fondement dans la réalité. Speculation in oil futures during the period in question almost certainly helped drive oil prices higher than was justified by fundamentals. Mais pourquoi les investisseurs qui achètent à terme du pétrole? Était la manie de contrats pétroliers simplement une autre bulle, comme la frénésie d'actions dot.com des années 90 en retard ou le boom immobilier de 2003 à 2006?
Pendant la période de 2005 à la mi-2008, la demande de pétrole a été en croissance, notamment en Chine (qui est passée du statut d'auto-suffisant en pétrole en 1995 à la deuxième étant avant tout le monde de l'importateur, après les Etats-Unis, en 2006). Mais l'offre mondiale de pétrole a été essentiellement stagnante: les chiffres mensuels de la production de pétrole brut a rebondi autour dans une bande assez étroite comprise entre 72 et 75 millions de barils par jour. Comme les prix ont augmenté, la production des chiffres à peine bougé en réponse. Il y avait tout porte à croire que tous les producteurs de pétrole ont été de pompage d'arrache-pied: même les Saoudiens semblent se précipiter pour tirer parti de la manne des prix.
Thus a good argument can be made that speculation in oil futures was merely magnifying price moves that were inevitable on the basis of the fundamentals of supply and demand. James Hamilton (dans sa publication précédemment citée) met de cette façon: «Avec le recul, il est difficile de nier que le prix était trop forte en Juillet 2008, et que cette erreur de calcul a été influencée en partie par le flux de dollars d'investissement en terme de matières premières contrats. Il convient de souligner, toutefois, que les deux ingrédients clés nécessaires pour faire une telle histoire cohérente, une faible élasticité-prix de la demande, et l'échec de la production physique d'augmenter, sont les mêmes éléments clés d'une explication basée sur les fondamentaux du le même phénomène. Je conclus donc que ces deux facteurs, plutôt que la spéculation en soi, doit être interprété comme la principale cause du choc pétrolier de 2007-08. "
Au lendemain de la crête
Il ya aussi la controverse sur ce ennuis degré dans les industries de l'automobile, du camionnage, et la compagnie aérienne doit être attribuée à la flambée des prix du pétrole ou l'effondrement économique. Bien sûr, si le diagnostic alternatif est correct, les deux derniers événements sont causalement liés dans aucun cas. Cependant, il peut être utile d'examiner la situation.
Chacun sait que GM et Chrysler ont fait faillite cette année parce que les ventes de voitures américaines de cratères. The current forecast is for sales of about 10.3 million vehicles in the US for 2009, down from last year's 13.2 million and 16.1 million in 2007. Les ventes de voitures aux États-Unis n'ont pas été aussi bas depuis les années 1970. Sales of light trucks, the most profitable vehicles, took the biggest hit during 2008, as fuel prices soared and car buyers avoided gas-guzzlers. Il était à ce point que les constructeurs automobiles a vraiment commencé à ressentir la douleur.
Maux de l'industrie aérienne sont résumées dans un récent document du GAO: «Après deux années de profits, l'industrie américaine du transport aérien de passagers a perdu 4,3 milliards de dollars dans les trois premiers trimestres de 2008 [alors que les prix du kérosène a grimpé]. Collectively, US airlines reduced domestic capacity, as measured by the number of seats flown, by about 9 percent from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2008…. To reduce capacity, airlines reduced the overall number of active aircraft in their fleets by 18 percent…. Compagnies aériennes aussi collectivement réduit leurs effectifs d'environ 28 000, soit près de 7 pour cent, de la fin de 2007 à la fin de l'année 2008 .... The contraction of the US airline industry in 2008 reduced airport revenues, passengers' access to the national aviation system, and revenues for the Trust Fund.” (11)
Pour l'industrie du camionnage, le carburant représente près de 40 pour cent du total des coûts opérationnels. En 2007, comme les prix du diesel ont augmenté, les transporteurs ont commencé à perdre de l'argent et a ajouté les surtaxes prix du carburant; En attendant le volume de fret a commencé à tomber. Après Juillet 2008, les prix du pétrole s'est écrasé, le tonnage a continué de baisser. Globalement, la baisse cumulée de charges pour les plateaux, citernes, fourgons et sèche comprise entre 15 et 20 pour cent seulement dans la période de Juin à Décembre 2008. (12)
Cette dernière série de statistiques soulève quelques questions cruciales pour la compréhension du diagnostic alternatif: Pourquoi, si la production mondiale de pétrole venait culminé, les prix du pétrole ne tombent dans les cinq derniers mois de 2008? Et, si les prix du pétrole ont été un facteur majeur dans la crise économique, pourquoi ne pas l'économie commencent à tourner autour d'après le prix adoucie?
Pourquoi les prix du pétrole chutent? And Why Didn't Lower Oil Prices Lead to a Quick Recovery?
The Peak Oil thesis predicts that, as world oil production reaches its maximum level and begins to decline, the price of oil will rise dramatically. But it also forecasts a dramatic increase in the volatility of prices .
L'argument va comme suit. Comme le pétrole se raréfie, son prix va augmenter jusqu'à ce qu'il commence à miner l'activité économique en général. La contraction économique aboutira alors à la demande substantiellement réduit pour le pétrole, qui à son tour provoquer son prix à tomber temporairement. Puis l'un des deux choses l'une: soit (a) l'économie commencera à se redresser, attisant la demande de pétrole a renouvelé, conduisant à nouveau à des prix élevés qui minent encore l'activité économique, ou (b), si l'économie ne récupérer rapidement, le pétrole la production va progressivement diminuer en raison de l'épuisement jusqu'au capacités de production inutilisées (créé par la baisse de la demande) est éliminée, conduisant à nouveau à la hausse des prix et une contraction encore plus économique. Dans les deux cas, les prix du pétrole demeurent volatils et l'économie se contracte. (13)
This scenario corresponds very closely with the reality that is unfolding, though it remains to be seen whether situation (a) or (b) will ensue.
Over the past three years, oil prices rose and fell more dramatically than would have been the case if it had not been for widespread speculation in oil futures. Néanmoins, la direction générale du prix-hauteur, puis en bas, puis à mi-chemin de retour, est entièrement compatible avec la thèse du pic pétrolier et le diagnostic alternatif.
Pourquoi l'économie n'est pas rapidement récupéré, étant donné que les prix du pétrole sont désormais seuls la moitié de ce qu'ils étaient en Juillet 2008? Encore une fois, le pic pétrolier n'est pas la seule cause de la crise économique actuelle. Enormous bubbles in the real estate and finance sectors constituted accidents waiting to happen, and the implosion of those bubbles has created a serious credit crisis (as well as solvency and looming currency crises) that will likely take several years to resolve even if energy supplies don't pose a problem.
But now the potential for renewed high oil prices acts as a ceiling for economic recovery. Chaque fois que l'économie ne semble pas montrer des signes de vie renouvelée (comme cela s'est produit en mai-Juillet de cette année, avec des valeurs de stock et de rebondir le rythme général de la contraction économique ralentit quelque peu), les prix du pétrole va décoller à nouveau que les spéculateurs pétroliers anticipent une reprise des la demande. Indeed, oil prices have rebounded from $30 in January to nearly $70 currently, provoking widespread concern that high energy prices could nip recovery in the bud. (14)
A barrel of oil from newly developed sources costs in the neighborhood of $60 to produce, now that all of the cheaper prospects have been exploited: finding new oilfields today usually means drilling under miles of ocean water, or in politically unstable nations where equipment and personnel are at high risk. (15) Ainsi, dès que les consommateurs demandent plus de pétrole, le prix devra rester nettement supérieure à ce chiffre afin de fournir des incitatifs pour les producteurs à forer.
Prix du pétrole volatils blessée à la hausse, mais elles nuisent également à la baisse. The oil price collapse of August-December 2008, plus the worsening credit crisis, caused a dramatic contraction in oil industry investment, leading to the cancellation of about $150 billion worth of new oil production projects—whose potential productive capacity will be required to offset declines in existing oilfields if world oil production is to remain stable. (16) This means that even if demand remains low, production capacity will almost certainly decline to meet those demand levels, causing oil prices to rise again in real terms at some point, perhaps two or three years from now. Prix du pétrole volatils nuisent également au développement des énergies alternatives, comme l'a montré au cours des derniers mois, lorsque les prix du pétrole a conduit à la chute des difficultés financières pour les fabricants d'éthanol. (17)
One way or another, growth will be highly problematic if not unachievable.
Big Picture Diagnosis: Continuing the Trail of Logic
À ce stade de la discussion de nombreux lecteurs se demanderont pourquoi les sources d'énergie alternatives et mesures d'efficacité ne peut être déployée pour résoudre la crise du pic pétrolier. Après tout, comme le pétrole devient plus cher, les voitures d'éthanol, le biodiesel et électriques commencent tous à regarder de plus attractif à la fois aux producteurs et aux consommateurs. Ne sera pas la magie du marché interviennent pour rendre pénurie de pétrole sans rapport avec la croissance future?
It is impossible in the context of this discussion to provide a detailed explanation of why the market probably cannot solve the Peak Oil problem. Une telle explication exige une discussion sur les critères d'évaluation de l'énergie, et une analyse des nombreuses alternatives d'énergie individuelle sur la base de ces critères. J'ai offert un bref aperçu de ce sujet auparavant et une beaucoup plus longtemps on est dans la presse. (18)
Mes conclusions sommaires à cet égard sont les suivantes.
About 85 percent of our current energy is derived from three primary sources—oil, natural gas, and coal—that are non-renewable, whose price is likely to trend sharply higher over the next years and decades leading to severe shortages, and whose environmental impacts are unacceptable. While these sources historically have had very high economic value, we cannot rely on them in the future; indeed, the longer the transition to alternative energy sources is delayed, the more difficult that transition will be unless some practical mix of alternative energy systems can be identified that will have superior economic and environmental characteristics.
But identifying such a mix is harder than one might initially think. Chaque source d'énergie a des caractéristiques très spécifiques. In fact, it has been the characteristics of our present energy sources (principally oil, coal, and natural gas) that have enabled the building of an urbanized society with high mobility, large population, and high economic growth rates. Surveying the available alternative energy sources for criteria such as energy density, environmental impacts, reliance on depleting raw materials, intermittency versus constancy of supply, and the percentage of energy returned on the energy invested in energy production, none currently appears capable of perpetuating this kind of society.
Par ailleurs, les systèmes énergétiques nationaux sont chers et lents à se développer. Energy efficiency likewise requires investment, and further incremental investments in efficiency tend to yield diminishing returns over time, since it is impossible to perform work with zero energy input. Où est-il la volonté ou la capacité à rassembler des capitaux d'investissement suffisant pour le déploiement de sources d'énergie alternatives et mesures d'efficacité à l'échelle requise?
Bien qu'il existe de nombreuses installations réussies alternatives de production d'énergie à travers le monde (allant de la petite maison échelle de systèmes photovoltaïques à grande «fermes» d'éoliennes de trois mégawatts), il ya très peu de nations industrielles modernes que maintenant obtenir l'essentiel de leur énergie à partir d'autres sources que le pétrole, le charbon et le gaz naturel. Un exemple est la Suède, qui obtient la plupart de son énergie d'origine nucléaire et hydroélectrique. Another is Iceland, which benefits from unusually large domestic geothermal resources not found in most other countries. Même pour ces deux nations, la situation est complexe: la construction de l'infrastructure pour leurs centrales plus souvent compté sur les combustibles fossiles pour l'extraction des minerais et des matières premières, pour le traitement des matériaux, de transport, pour la fabrication de composants pour la l'exploitation minière de l'uranium, l'énergie de la construction, et ainsi de suite. Ainsi, une transition énergétique significative des carburants fossiles est toujours une question de théorie et de vœux pieux, pas la réalité.
Ma conclusion d'une enquête minutieuse des énergies alternatives, alors, est qu'il ya peu de chances que ce soit des combustibles fossiles classiques ou sources d'énergie alternatives peuvent compter sur lui pour fournir la quantité et la qualité de l'énergie qui sera nécessaire pour soutenir la croissance économique, voire niveau actuel d'activité économique pendant le reste de ce siècle. (19)
But the problem extends beyond oil and other fossil fuels: the world's fresh water resources are strained to the point that billions of people may soon find themselves with only precarious access to water for drinking and irrigation. La biodiversité est en déclin rapide. Nous perdons 24 milliards de tonnes de couche arable chaque année à l'érosion. Et de nombreux minéraux à partir économiquement significative d'antimoine au zinc-s'épuisent rapidement, nécessitant l'extraction de plus en plus faible teneur des minerais dans des endroits de plus en plus distante. Thus the Peak Oil crisis is really just the leading edge of a broader Peak Everything dilemma.
In essence, humanity faces an entirely predictable peril: our population has been growing dramatically for the past 200 years (expanding from under one billion to nearly seven billion), while our per-capita consumption of resources has also grown. For any species, this is virtually the definition of biological success. And yet all of this has taken place in the context of a finite planet with fixed stores of non-renewable resources (fossil fuels and minerals), a limited ability to regenerate renewable resources (forests, fish, fresh water, and topsoil), and a limited ability to absorb industrial wastes (including carbon dioxide). Si on prend du recul et de regarder la période industrielle dans une perspective historique plus large qui est éclairé par une appréciation des limites écologiques, il est difficile d'éviter la conclusion que nous vivons aujourd'hui à l'issue d'une relativement brève impulsion d'un an 200 rapide de la phase d'expansion activé par une subvention d'énergie temporaire (sous forme de combustibles fossiles bon marché) qui sera inévitablement suivie par une contraction encore plus rapides et spectaculaires que ceux des carburants épuiser.
The winding down of this historic growth-contraction pulse doesn't necessarily mean the end of the world, but it does mean the end of a certain kind of economy. One way or another, humanity must return to a more normal pattern of existence characterized by reliance on immediate solar income (via crops, wind, or the direct conversion of sunlight to electricity) rather than stored ancient sunlight.
Cela ne veut pas dire que le reste du 21ème siècle doit être composé d'un effondrement de l'industrialisme, un die-off de la plupart de la population humaine, et un retour par les survivants d'un mode de vie essentiellement identique à celle des paysans du 16ème siècle ou indigènes chasseurs-cueilleurs. It is possible instead to imagine acceptable and even inviting ways in which humanity could adapt to ecological limits while further developing cultural richness, scientific understanding, and quality of life (more of this below).
Mais cependant il est négocié, la transition se fera sort un terme à la croissance économique dans le sens conventionnel. Et cette transition semble avoir commencé.
How Do We Know Which Diagnosis Is Correct?
If the patient is an individual human and the cause of distress is uncertain, more diagnostic tests can be prescribed. Mais pour quelles sortes de tests sanguins, radiographies et tomodensitométrie peut-on soumettre l'économie nationale ou mondiale?
Dans un sens, les tests ont déjà été faites. During the past few decades thousands of scientific surveys of natural resources, biodiversity, and ecosystems have showed increasing rates of depletion and decline. (20) L'augmentation continue de la population humaine, la pollution et la consommation sont également bien documentés. Cette information a constitué la base pour les limites d'études de croissance, a été mentionné précédemment, qui utilisent des modèles informatiques pour montrer comment les tendances actuelles sont susceptibles de jouer pour les rues et la plupart des scénarios résultant de leur montrer menant à une fin de la croissance économique et un effondrement de la production industrielle des temps dans le début du 21e siècle.
Pourquoi les résultats de ces tests de diagnostic n'est pas universellement accepté comme un défi aux attentes d'une croissance continue? Principalement parce que leur conclusion va à l'encontre des croyances et des proclamations de la plupart des économistes, qui affirment qu'il n'y a pas de limites pratiques à la croissance. Ils nient que les contraintes de ressources fournissent un plafond éventuel sur la production et de consommation. Et donc leurs efforts de diagnostic ont tendance à ignorer les facteurs environnementaux en faveur de l'faciles à mesurer les caractéristiques internes de l'économie humaine comme l'offre de monnaie, la confiance des consommateurs, des taux d'intérêt, et les indices de prix.
Ecologist Charles Hall, among many others, has argued that the discipline of economics, as currently practiced, does not constitute a science, since it proceeds primarily on the basis of correlative logic rather than through the building of knowledge by a continuous, rigorous process of proposing and testing hypotheses. (21) While economics uses complex terminology and mathematics, as science does, its basic assertions about the world—such as the principle of infinite substitutability, which holds that for any resource that becomes scarce, the market will find a substitute—are not subjected to careful experimental examination. (Il est à noter que Hall et d'autres ont fait l'effort de jeter les bases conceptuelles pour une nouvelle économie fondée sur des principes scientifiques et les méthodes, qu'ils appellent «l'économie biophysique.» (22)
Moreover, mainstream economists failed on the whole to foresee the current crash. Il n'y avait aucun effort constant ou concertée de la part des secrétaires du Trésor, la Réserve fédérale présidents, ou «prix Nobel» primé économistes pour avertir les décideurs ou le public en général que, dans le courant de début du 21ème siècle, l'économie mondiale allait commencer à venir en lambeaux. (23) On pourrait penser que cet échec-la valeur prédictive incapacité à prévoir afin d'importance historique d'un événement comme la contraction rapide de près de toute l'économie mondiale, entraînant l'échec de certaines des plus grandes banques du monde et de fabrication des sociétés-causerait économistes du courant dominant aux arrêter et réexaminer leurs prémisses fondamentales. Mais il ya peu de preuves pour suggérer que cela se produit.
At the risk of repetition: physical scientists from several disciplines have indeed foreseen an end to economic growth in the early 21st century, and have warned policy makers and the general public on many occasions.
Qui devons-nous croire?
Les spécificités de l'autre diagnostic sont falsifiables. Si l'activité économique ont été repasser au-dessus des niveaux de 2007, ou si la production de pétrole devaient augmenter au-dessus du Juillet 2008 de haut marque d'eau, puis l'attribution de la crise économique actuelle aux ressources liées limites à la croissance peut être considérée, au moins partiellement réfutées. However, even if these things were to occur, the underlying reasoning behind the Alternative Diagnosis might still be correct. If the world oil production peak is delayed until, let us say, 2015 or 2020, and if another—this time bottomless—global economic crash results then, the ultimate outcome will be essentially the same. But if, meanwhile, the Alternative Diagnosis were to be taken seriously and acted upon, the consequences of doing so would be beneficial: a decade would have been spent preparing for the event.
Could the Alternative Diagnosis be altogether wrong? That is, might conventional economists be right in thinking that growth can continue forever? It is often said that anything is possible, but some things are clearly much more possible than others. The perpetual growth of human population and consumption within the confines of a finite planet seems like a very long shot indeed, especially since warning signs are everywhere apparent that ecological limits are already being reached and surpassed. (24)
What Not to Do: Prescribe Punishingly Expensive Placebos
If the physical scientists who warn about limits to growth are right, confronting the global economic meltdown implies far more than merely getting the banks and mortgage lenders back on their feet. Indeed, in that case we face a fundamental change in our economy as significant as the advent of the industrial revolution. We are at a historic inflection point—the ending of decades of expansion and the beginning of an inevitable period of contraction that will continue until humanity is once again living within the limits of Earth's regenerative systems.
But there are few signs that policy makers understand any of this. Their thinking appears to be shaped primarily by mainstream economists' assurances that growth can and must continue into the indefinite future, and that the economic contraction the world is currently experiencing is only temporary–a problem that can and must be solved.
Still, the problem is not a minor one in the eyes of economists and policy makers. Consider the gargantuan size of the Treasury and Federal Reserve bailouts and stimulus packages that have been deployed in the possibly futile attempt to end contraction and restart growth. According to the special inspector general of the US government's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), in remarks submitted to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on July 21, $23.7 trillion have been committed in “total potential federal government support.” This is expensive medicine indeed. It takes a moment to even begin to comprehend the enormity of the figure. It represents about half of annual world GDP, and is over three times the total amount spent by the US government, in inflation-adjusted dollars, on all wars combined, from 1776 to the present. It is nearly fifty times the cost of the New Deal.
Other nations, including Britain, China, and Germany have committed to paying for stimulus packages and bailouts that, while much smaller in absolute terms, represent an impressive (or should we say frightful?) share of national GDP.
If the Alternative Diagnosis is valid, none of this will work in the end, because existing financial institutions—with their basis in debt and interest and their requirements for constant expansion—cannot be made to function in a context where energy and resource constraints impose effective caps on manufacturing and transport.
Are the bailouts and stimulus packages working? Much evidence suggests that they are not, except in limited ways. In the US, unemployment continues to increase, while real estate values continue to fall. And most of the reputed “green shoots” in the economy so far sighted amount merely to an arguably temporary decline in the rate of contraction. For example, the home price index released July 28 of this year showed that in May, seasonally adjusted prices fell just 0.16 percent from the previous month. That represents an annual rate of decline of a little under 2 percent, which is a substantial improvement over the annualized rate of more than 20 percent that prevailed from September 2008 through March of 2009. Many commentators seized upon this news as a sign of an imminent turnaround. Nevertheless, new home sales are down from 1.4 million per year in 2005 to 350,000 per year today, and house prices are down 50 percent from the bubble peak and still declining in most places. Moreover, manufacturing is still shrinking, small businesses are in trouble, there are still significant danger signs on the horizon, including a new round of mortgage resets, a likely dive in commercial real estate values, and the looming reality that toxic assets at the center of the banking crisis have yet to be dealt with. (25)
President Obama has made the argument that bailouts are justified to stabilize the system long enough so that leaders can make fundamental changes to institutions and regulations, enabling the economy to then go forward healthier and more immune to similar crises in the future. But there is little to suggest that the kinds of systemic changes that are actually needed (ones that would enable the economy to function during a prolonged period of contraction) are under way or even contemplated. Meanwhile, as growth-based institutions are temporarily propped up, the ultimate scale of the damage is likely only to increase: when the inevitable collapse of those institutions does come, the consequences will likely be even worse because so much capital will have been squandered in attempting to salvage them.
In using up non-renewable resources like metals, minerals, and fossil fuels, we have stolen from future generations. Now in effect we are stealing from those generations the financial wherewithal that could have been used to build a bridge to a sustainable economy. The construction of a renewable energy infrastructure (including not only generating capacity, but distribution and storage systems, as well as post-petroleum transport and agriculture systems) will require enormous investments and decades of work. Where will the investment capital come from if governments are already buried in debt? If we have committed nearly $24 trillion to propping up an old economy with no real survival prospects, what's left with which to finance the new one?
If the current prescription for our economic malady is wrong-headed, the same is true of many proposed cures for our energy problems. According to the Conventional Diagnosis, today's high oil prices are due to speculation; the cure must therefore lie in the tighter regulation of oil futures trading (which may be a good idea, though it doesn't get to the heart of the problem), while providing more opportunities to oil companies to explore for domestic oil (even though the likely production rates from currently off-limits reserves would be relatively paltry, and would have a negligible effect on oil prices). In fact, though, investing further in fossil fuel energy systems (including “clean coal” technology) will yield declining returns, given that the highest quality resources have already been used up; meanwhile, doing so takes investment capital away from the development of renewable energy, which we will have to rely on increasingly as fossil fuels deplete. (26)
What is required but is still utterly lacking is a fundamental recognition that circumstances have changed: what worked decades ago will not work now.
What To Do: Adapt to the New Reality
If the Alternative Diagnosis is correct, there will be no easy fix for the current economic breakdown. Some illnesses are not curable; they require that we simply adapt and make the best of our new situation.
If humanity has indeed embarked upon the contraction phase of the industrial pulse, we should assume that ahead of us lie much lower average income levels (for nearly everyone in the wealthy nations, and for high wage earners in poorer nations); different employment opportunities (fewer jobs in sales, marketing, and finance; more in basic production); and more costly energy, transport, and food. Further, we should assume that key aspects of our economic system that are inextricably tied to the need for future growth will cease to work in this new context.
What can we do to adapt most rapidly and successfully?
Rather than attempting to prop up banks and insurance companies with trillions in bailouts, it would probably be better simply to let them fail, however nasty the short-term consequences, since they will fail anyway sooner or later. The sooner they are replaced with institutions that serve essential functions within a contracting economy, the better off we will all be. (27)
Meanwhile the thought-leaders in society, especially the President, must begin breaking the news—in understandable and measured ways—that growth isn't returning and that the world has entered a new and unprecedented economic phase, but that we can all survive and thrive in this challenging transitional period if we apply ourselves and work together. At the heart of this general re-education must be a public and institutional acknowledgment of three basic rules of sustainability: growth in population cannot be sustained; the ongoing extraction of non-renewable resources cannot be sustained; and the use of renewable resources is sustainable only if it proceeds at rates below those of natural replenishment.
Without cheap energy, global trade cannot increase. This doesn't mean that trade will disappear, only that economic incentives will inexorably shift as transport costs rise, favoring local production for local consumption. But this may be a nice way of putting it: if and when fuel shortages arise, fragile globe-spanning systems of provisioning could be disrupted, with dire effects for consumers cut off from sources of necessary products. Thus a high priority must be placed on the building of community resilience through the preferential local sourcing of necessities and the maintenance of larger regional inventories—especially of food and fuel. (28)
It currently takes an average of 8.5 calories of energy from oil and natural gas to produce each calorie of food energy. Without cheap fuel for agriculture, farm production will plummet and farmers will go bankrupt—unless proactive efforts are undertaken to reform agriculture to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels. (29)
Obviously, alternative energy sources and energy efficiency strategies must be high priorities, and must be subjects of intensive research using a carefully chosen spectrum of criteria. The best candidates will have to be funded robustly even while fossil fuels are still relatively cheap: the build-out time for the renewable energy infrastructure will inevitably be measured in decades and so we must begin the process now rather than waiting for market forces to lead the way.
In the face of credit and (potential) currency crises, new ways of financing such projects will be needed. Given that our current monetary and financial systems are founded on the need for growth, we will require new ways of creating money and new ways of issuing credit. Considerable thought has gone into finding solutions to this problem, and some communities are already experimenting with local capital co-ops, alternative currencies, and no-interest banks. (30)
With oil becoming increasingly expensive in real terms, we will need more efficient ways of getting people and goods around. Our first priority in this regard must be to reduce the need for transport with better urban planning and re-localized production systems. But where transport is needed, rail and light rail will probably be preferable to cars and trucks. (31)
We will also need a revolution in the built environment to minimize the requirement for heating, cooling, and artificial lighting in all our homes and public buildings. This revolution is already under way, but is currently moving far too slowly due to the inertia of established interests in the construction industry. (32)
These projects will need more than local credit and money; they will also require skilled workers. There will be a call not just for installers of solar panels and home insulation: millions of new food producers and builders of low-energy infrastructure will be needed as well. A broad range of new opportunities could open up to replace vanishing jobs in marketing and finance—if there is cheap training available at local community colleges.
It is worth noting that the $23.7 trillion recently committed for US bailouts and loan guarantees represents about $80,000 for each man, woman, and child in America. A level of investment even a substantial fraction that size could pay for all needed job training while ensuring universal provision of basic necessities during the transition. What would we be getting for our money? A collective sense that, in a time of crisis, no one is being left behind. Without the feeling of cooperative buy-in that such a safety net would help engender, similar to what was achieved with the New Deal but on an even larger scale, economic contraction could devolve into a horrific fight over the scraps of the waning industrial period.
However contentious, the population question must be addressed. All problems that have to do with resources are harder to solve when there are more people needing those resources. The US must encourage smaller families and must establish an immigration policy consistent with a no-growth population target. This has foreign policy implications: we must help other nations succeed with their own economic transitions so that their citizens do not have to emigrate to survive. (33)
If economic growth ceases to be an achievable goal, society will have to find better ways of measuring success. Economists must shift from assessing well-being with the blunt instrument of GDP, and begin paying more attention to indices of human and social capital in areas such as education, health, and cultural achievements. This redefinition of growth and progress has already begun in some quarters, but for the most part has yet to be taken up by governments. (34)
A case can be made that after all this is done the end result will be a more satisfying way of life for the vast majority of citizens—offering more of a sense of community, more of a connection with the natural world, more satisfying work, and a healthier environment. Studies have repeatedly shown that higher levels of consumption do not translate to elevated levels of satisfaction with life. (35) This means that if “progress” can be thought of in terms of happiness, rather than a constantly accelerating process of extracting raw materials and turning them into products that themselves quickly become waste, then progress can certainly continue. In any case, “selling” this enormous and unprecedented project to the general public will require emphasizing its benefits. Several organizations are already exploring the messaging and public relations aspects of the transition. (36) But those in charge need to understand that looking on the bright side doesn't mean promising what can't be delivered—such as a return to the days of growth and thoughtless consumption.
Can We? Will We?
It is important to state the implications of all this as plainly as possible. If the Alternative Diagnosis is correct, there will be no full economic “recovery”—not this year, or the next, or five or ten years from now. There may be temporary rebounds that take us back to some fraction of peak economic activity, but these will be only brief respites.
We have entered a new economic era in which the former rules no longer apply. Low interest rates and government spending no longer translate to incentives for borrowing and job production. Cheap energy won't appear just because there is demand for it. Substitutes for essential resources will in most cases not be found. Over all, the economy will continue to shrink in fits and starts until it can be maintained by the energy and material resources that Earth can supply on ongoing basis.
This is of course very difficult news. It is analogous to being told by your physician that you have contracted a systemic, potentially fatal disease that cannot be cured, but only managed; and managing it means you must make profound lifestyle changes.
Certains lecteurs peuvent noter que le changement climatique n'a pas figuré en bonne place dans cette discussion. It is clearly, after all, the worst environmental catastrophe in human history. Indeed, its consequences could be far worse than the mere destruction of national economies: hundreds of millions of people and millions of other species could be imperiled. The reason for the relatively limited discussion of climate here is that (assuming the Alternative Diagnosis is correct) it is not climate change that has proven to be the most immediate limit to economic growth, but resource depletion. However, while there is not as yet general agreement on the point, climate change itself and the needed steps to minimize it both constitute limits to growth, just as resource depletion does. Moreover, if we fail to successfully manage the inevitable process of economic contraction that will characterize the coming decades, there will be no hope of mounting an organized and coherent response to climate change—a response consisting of efforts both to reduce climate impacts and to adapt to them . It is important to note, though, that the measures advocated here (including the development of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, a rapid reduction of reliance on fossil fuels in transport and agriculture, and the stabilization of population levels) are among the steps that will help most to reduce carbon emissions.
Is this essay likely to change the thinking and actions of policy makers? Unfortunately, that is unlikely. Their belief in the possibility and necessity of continued growth is pervasive, and the notion that growth may no longer be possible is unthinkable. But the Alternative Diagnosis must be a matter of record. This essay, composed by a mere journalist, in many ways represents the thinking of thousands of physical scientists working over the past several decades on issues having to do with population, resources, pollution, and biodiversity. Ignoring the diagnosis itself—whether as articulated here or as implied in tens of thousands of scientific papers—may waste our last chance to avert a complete collapse, not just of the economy, but of civility and organized human existence. It may risk a historic discontinuity with qualitative antecedents in the fall of the Roman and Mayan civilizations. (37) But there is no true precedent for what may be in store, because those earlier examples of collapse affected geographically bounded societies whose influence on their environments was also bounded. Today's civilization is global, and its fate, Earth's fate, and humanity's fate are inextricably tied.
But even if policy makers continue to ignore warnings such as this, individuals and communities can take heed and begin the process of building resilience, and of detaching themselves from reliance on fossil fuels and institutions that are inextricably tied to the perpetual growth machine. We cannot sit passively by as world leaders squander opportunites to awaken and adapt to growth limits. We can make changes in our own lives, and we can join with our neighbors. And we can let policy makers know we disapprove of their allegiance to the status quo, but that there are other options.
Is it too late to begin a managed transition to a post-fossil fuel society? Peut-être. But we will not know unless we try. And if we are to make that effort, we must begin by acknowledging one simple, stark reality: growth as we have known it can no longer be our goal.
Infinite Economic Growth on a Finite planet is impossible, and the economic and social systems built upon this assumption are doomed to fail. No more time should be wasted in supporting this system, and instead the creation of local resilient communities should be our primary focus. If anything, Richard does not go far enough – his expressed hope in an alternative energy economy is unrealistic in the face of the huge embodied energy costs required to build and maintain the infrastructure needed for renewable energy to provide even a fraction of today's decadence. Any attempts to create a 'green' civilisation are misplaced, although the suggestion of community resilience as a key component of what we can do is shared here. We need to disconnect from the perpetual growth system and instead reconnect to the earth and form the stable community-based systems that can run in harmony within the earth-system. Let's seize the opportunities this recession is bringing and make this vision a reality!
